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union_civil_war1_clr.gif (10192 bytes)Antietamarmyofthenorthernvirginia_clr.gif (7810 bytes)

In early September 1862, General Robert E. Lee led his Confederate Army of Northern Virginia on its first invasion of the North.   Lee realized that the Union's power and resources were almost limitless and that if he could win a major battle on Union soil, then perhaps some of the border states, such as Maryland, might revolt and join the Confederacy.  Victory might also persuade France and England to recognize the Confederacy.  An offensive thrust into the North would also give the war-torn Southern states a chance to recuperate and allow the Southern troops to live off of the rich Northern land. 

Lee intended to destroy the Pennsylvania Railroad bridge that spanned the Susquehanna River as well as other railroad lines that kept supplies flowing for the North.  If his army of 55,000 men could get loose on Northern soil, they could threaten Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Washington. Action such as this would force the Union Army of the Potomac to go on the defensive.

General George B. McClellan had recently been appointed commander of the Army of the Potomac and was busy reorganizing the army after their defeat at the Seven Days Battle and Second Manassas.  President Abraham Lincoln had given McClellan two goals: To keep his army of 90,000 between Lee's army and Washington, and hopefully, destroy it.

McClellan was a master of organization but a very cautious man.  He was able to quickly organize his downtrodden men and get them on the march as soon as he heard of Lee's movements.  Lincoln was already suspicious of McClellan's methodical, plodding ways - not a good trait when quick and decisive actions are needed in time of crisis.  

Prior to moving north into Pennsylvania, Lee needed to clear his lines back to Richmond.  In order to do this he needed to eliminate the 12,000 troop Union garrison at Harpers Ferry, West Virginia.  The garrison, located on the West Virginia - Maryland border, was wedged between the Potomac and Shenadoah rivers.  On September 9, he issued Special Order 191.  This order would split his army into four parts, three of which would converge on Harpers Ferry while the fourth, commanded by Maj. Gen. James Longstreet and Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, moved north to Hagerstown and waited for the arrival of the other three.  The forces attacking Harpers Ferry would be led by Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws, Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, and Brig. Gen. John Walker.

Lee felt that with McClellan's caution he would have ample time to defeat the Union troops at Harpers Ferry and reform before confronting the Army of the Potomac.  It was at this point that an incredible stroke of good luck befell the Union Army.  Up until this time, D.H. Hill, Jackson's brother-in-law, had been under Jackson's command.  Jackson was unaware that Hill already had been issued orders and therefore prepared an extra copy for Hill and ordered it delivered to him.  The order was then mistakenly lost by the messenger.

On September 13, the extra copy of Lee's order was found by a Union soldier and delivered to McClellan.  The order was in Jackson's handwriting.   There could be no doubt of it's authenticity.  McClellan now knew the Confederate's exact plans. 

McClellan began marching his troops towards Harpers Ferry.  Lee was notified of the approaching columns and began to worry.  Would McClellan catch Lee's army split into four parts and crush it piecemeal?

On September 15, Lee was about to call off the attack on Harpers Ferry when Jackson sent a message indicating he had defeated the garrison there.  Jackson left Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill and his troops behind to mop up while he began marching his troops towards Sharpsburg, some 17 miles away.   

Lee decided that Sharpsburg's rocky terrain would provide excellent cover for his men and decided this was the place to fight.  If faced with trouble, the Potomac River was a short retreat away.

Despite knowing the Confederates every intention, McClellan plodded along slowly.  On the afternoon of September 16, the armies met on the Northern outskirts of Sharpsburg.  An artillery battle began and caused the skirmishers on both sides to seek cover.  As darkness fell, the soldiers of both armies knew they would be involved in a massive battle the next day.  Neither side slept much.

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500 Cannons were used at Antietam

McClellan's plan consisted of three parts.  The first part was to attack the Confederate's left flank in the area of the Dunker Church and Miller's cornfield (north of town).  The second part was to attack the Confederate's right flank across the Lower Bridge (east and slightly south of town).  The final piece of the plan was to attack the Confederate's center and crush the Army of Northern Virginia.

It was a good plan.  However, the attacks would need to be carried out in immediate sequence with no hesitation.  The Union army was much larger than Lee's and if they could sustain the pressure with out relent, the Confederates would be crushed.

Morning Phase 

At 6:00 a.m. Union troops marched through Miller's cornfield towards the Confederate lines. They falsely believed that the large corn stalks concealed them.  When they reached the edge of the cornfield, the concealed Confederate rose up and the two sides began pouring immense gunfire into one another from short range.  Union Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker ordered his artillery to fire across the cornfield; a great slaughter of Confederate soldiers occurred as the entire cornfield was mowed down.  The Union troops, sensing victory, charged forward.  

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Miller's cornfield (the corn stalks are short in this picture due to the 1999 drought)

The Union troops advanced to the Dunker Church.  They attacked in separate movements, not together as one powerful force.  This division of power allowed the Confederates to shift troops from one hot spot to the next and hold off the Union assaults.

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The Dunker Church

Jackson saw the Union troops advancing and ordered 10,000 Confederate troops, who had just arrived from Harpers Ferry, to set an ambush in the West Woods area.  The Union troops, led by Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick marched in a long column right into the middle of the trap.  The ensuing massacre left half of Sedgwick's 5,000 men as casualties in less than twenty minutes.

The Confederate troops seized the initiative and went on the attack.   Union artillery repulsed their attack and forced them to fall back to the woods.   Although weakened, the Confederates lines did not collapse.  the Cornfield was captured and recaptured four times during the morning's phase of the battle.  To learn more about the battle for the cornfield, click here.

Midday Phase

Union Brig. Gen. William French and his division had been closely following Sedgewick's, but in the confusion of battle they became separated.   French's troops marched  parade style towards a ridge that contained a deeply cut road known as the Sunken Lane.  This lane provided a natural trench and excellent cover for D. H. Hill's Confederate troops.  They were busy fortifying their position when French's troops approached.

From their concealed position in the lane, the Confederates poured heavy fire into the advancing Union troops.  For three and a half hours the fighting for the Sunken Lane continued with both sides rushing up reserves.  The Union troops were eventually able to punch a hole in the Confederate line and fire lengthwise into the lane.   The Confederates were forced to retreat but were able to keep the Union troops from completely overrunning them. 

So many men had fallen in and around the lane that it was said that a man could have walked down the lane without ever touching the ground.  The lane had a new name: The Bloody Lane.

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The Bloody Lane

McClellan had seriously weakened the Confederate's center.  Instead of choosing to throw in his reserves and take advantage of the situation, McClellan inexplicably decided to go on the defensive.  Lee could not believe his good fortune and briefly even considered going back on the offensive.

Afternoon Phase

The third part of McClellan's plan called for Union troops led by Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside to assault the Confederates right flank.  Burnside failed to adequately scout the area and therefore believed that the only way to cross the Antietam Creek was to cross the Lower Bridge (there were fords nearby that his troops could have used to wade across the creek).  Burnside ordered his IX Corps to concentrate their attack on the bridge.

Across the bridge on a steep hill were 400 dug in Georgia troops that had an excellent view of the bridge and the approaches to it.  Around 9 a.m. the Union troops began their assault on the bridge.  The Georgia troops repulsed wave after wave of Union attackers.

Late in the morning a division of Union troops crossed the creek a mile downstream and began attacking the Georgia troops on their right flank.  At 1 p.m. two Union regiments charged across the bridge and drove the Confederates off the west bank of the creek.  Burnside then paused to reorganize his men.  The bridge was later renamed Burnside Bridge.  

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Burnside's Bridge

At 3 p.m. Burnside's troops finally began their assault on the Confederate right and center, rapidly closing off Lee's line of retreat to the Potomac.   The Army of Northern Virginia was trapped and close annihilation. 

As all appeared to be lost for the Confederates, A. P. Hill's men arrived from Harpers Ferry and were able to hold off the Union advances.  The Union commander called off the attack. Had Burnside's attack taken place in mid-morning, as ordered, the Union Army could have achieved total victory.

During the evening, McClellan received strong reinforcements and clearly had a numerical advantage.  Yet he decided not to go on the attack and repeatedly asked Washington for more reinforcements and time.

Meanwhile, Lee had his troops brace for a possible Union assault.   Lee even considered going back on the attack but was convinced by his officers that the Union held the high ground and any Confederate attack at this point would be doomed.   On the night of September 18, Lee's troops began their retreat across the Potomac.

Aftermath

Despite President Lincoln's insistence, McClellan chose not to pursue the Army of Northern Virginia.  Lincoln traveled to Antietam on October 1, but still could not convince McClellan to continue the attack on Lee's troops.  Lincoln removed McClellan from command on November 7.

Another figure that emerged from the battle was Clara Barton.  With a wagon full of medical supplies donated by the citizens of Washington, Miss. Barton tended to the wounded during and after the battle.  She would later found the American Red Cross.

Antietam was the bloodiest single day in American history.  Nearly four times as many Americans became casualties at Antietam (called the Battle of Sharpsburg in the South) as did on D-Day.  Never again in American history has a battle so deadly and so fierce been waged. 

Tactically, Antietam was a draw.  Strategically though, the Union had halted the Confederate invasion of the North.  Antietam gave Lincoln the victory he needed.  On September 22, he issued the Emancipation Proclamation and gave the war weary North a new purpose for fighting the war - freedom for the slaves.  For information on the Antietam National Battlefield, click here.

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  Antietam National Cemetery

  Killed Wounded Missing Total % of Total
Union 2,108 9,549 753 12,410 14.3%
Confederate 1,512 7,816 1,844 11,172 27.3%